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The origins of qualia1
 Tim Crane
1. The contemporary mind-body problem
The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two  parts: the problem of
mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated;
in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the
causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all
causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the
phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are
physical.2 One may avoid this dilemma by adopting an epiphenomenalist view of
consciousness, of course; but there is little independent reason for believing such a
view. Rejecting epiphenomenalism, then, leaves contemporary philosophers with their
problem: mental causation inclines them towards physicalism, while consciousness
inclines them towards dualism.
To accept that this is the way that the problem is generally conceived is not to
accept that the problem has been well-formulated. One may legitimately question the
assumptions which give rise to the mental causation problem: for instance, what are
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2the grounds for believing that anything that interacts with something physical must
itself be physical? And how can we formulate a conception of the ‘physical’ which does
not render the question trivial (as would be done by treating the physical as the
causal)?3 However, as an account of the current state of the debate within
contemporary philosophy of mind, the above description of the problem ought to be
fairly uncontroversial.
It is perhaps equally uncontroversial to say that while the problem of mental
causation is regarded as a relatively ‘technical’ problem—whose solution requires only
a more careful treatment of the notions of causation or physical realisation—the
problem of consciousness is thought to be a deeper and more difficult problem for
physicalists and non-physicalists alike. The problem is often expressed in terms of
‘qualia’: the ‘qualitative’ or ‘phenomenal’ features of conscious states of mind. How can
a mere physical object, which we know a person to be, have states of mind with
qualitative features or qualia? This question, which poses what David Chalmers calls the
‘hard problem’ of consciousness, is supposed to be the real heart of the mind-body
problem in today’s philosophy.4 As Jaegwon Kim puts it, ‘the stance you take on the
problem of qualia [is] a decisive choice point with respect to the mind-body problem’.5
To have a clear understanding of this problem, we have to have a clear
understanding of the notion of qualia. But despite the centrality of this notion in
formulating this aspect of the mind-body problem, it seems to me that there is
not a clear consensus about how the term ‘qualia’ should be understood, and to
this extent the contemporary problem of consciousness is not well-posed. The
difficulty here can be vividly brought out at first by considering the fact that
there seems to be a real dispute about whether qualia exist at all. Anyone with
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3the slightest familiarity with the recent debate will be aware that some
philosophers take the existence of qualia to be an obvious fact, while others deny
their existence. So on the one hand, we find Ned Block responding to the
question, ‘what is it that philosophers have called qualitative states?’ with the
quip: ‘As Louis Armstrong said when asked what jazz is, “If you got to ask, you
ain’t never gonna get to know’”.6 But on the other hand, we find Michael Tye
and Gilbert Harman arguing that there are no qualia in visual experience, and
Daniel Dennett denying the existence of any qualia whatsoever. In Consciousness
Explained, Dennett says:
Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or
properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for
the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the
‘external’ world by the triumphs of physics: ‘raw feels’, sensa’ ‘phenomenal
qualities’, ‘intrinsic properties of conscious experiences’, the ‘qualitative content
of mental states’ and of course ‘qualia’...There are subtle differences in how
these terms have been defined, but ... I am denying there are any such
properties.7
At first sight, this dispute might seem to be a straightforward ontological matter, like a
dispute about the existence of numbers or universals. But closer reflection shows that
the dispute cannot be exactly like this. For the normal route to introducing numbers or
universals into an ontology is that they explain some phenomenon which is agreed on
all sides to exist and require an explanation: mathematical practice, or apparent
sameness of kind. The claim is that we should believe in these entities because they
explain the obvious truths about the ‘appearances’, broadly understood. But the truths
about qualia, by contrast, are supposed to be truths about the appearances themselves,
about how things seem to us in experience. And it is reasonable to expect that how
things seem to us should not be a theoretical posit, but a pre-theoretical starting point:
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4a point from which to embark on a debate, where things are relatively obvious to all
its participants. This is clear from Block’s remark: that there are qualia is supposed to
be something obvious, something whose existence a moment’s reflection on
experience or consciousness is supposed to establish. A theory of consciousness is a
theory of qualia: qualia are the data to be explained by a theory of consciousness. A
similar approach is taken by Kim and Chalmers. Yet Dennett, Tye and Harman take
themselves to be giving theories of experience while denying the existence of qualia
(or at least of qualia of a certain kind). And Fred Dretske and W.G. Lycan argue,
against Block, that qualia should be conceived as intentional states.8 Furthermore, Tye
and Harman argue against qualia by reflecting on experience, and claiming that it is
obvious that there are no such things as qualia in perceptual experience. What Block
claims obviously exist Tye and Harman claim obviously don’t exist. What is going on?
How can there be such extreme disagreement about what is obvious?9
The aim of this paper is to gain an understanding this dispute by examining
some of its historical origins in Twentieth Century philosophy. In particular, I shall be
concerned with the origins of the terms ‘quale’ and ‘qualia’, and with how these terms
became central in the formulation of the mind-body problem. I shall claim that the
debate will not be advanced by ‘focussing inwards’ (to use a phrase of Colin McGinn’s)
and swapping intuitions about what is obvious. Rather, we should try and make
progress by understanding how the term ‘qualia’ (the concept of qualia) has entered
the debate, by trying to see what role the term was introduced to play and for what
purpose, and how this purpose may or may not differ from the purposes of
contemporary disputants. The question on which I want to focus is: what was the
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5original point  of talking in terms of qualia, and does this point differ from the point
which contemporary philosophers are trying to make by using the term?
I begin by examining a connection between the dispute about qualia and a
dispute which many would now consider defunct: the debate over sense-data in the
philosophy of perception. I argue that a similar puzzle arises there as arises over
qualia, and that the solution to the puzzle gives the resources to suggest, in broad
outline, how the dispute over qualia may be resolved. Section 3 then gives an account
of the origin of the notion of qualia, and its relation to the notion of sense-data. I claim
that in the philosophy of mind of the first half of this century, qualia and sense-data
play similar roles: sense-data are objects of experience and qualia their properties. In
section 4, I explain how qualia came to play a different role in subsequent discussions
of the mind-body problem: rather than being properties of the objects of experience,
they became properties of the experiences themselves. Section 5 outlines why this
change took place, and suggests the conclusion that the most plausible conception of
qualia in contemporary philosophy is an intentionalist one (or, better, a conception
which rejects qualia as they are normally understood). This final conclusion is, strictly
speaking, independent of the investigation into the origins of qualia—but I nonetheless
believe that the proper lesson of the historical investigation is that to appreciate the
origins of qualia is to appreciate why we no longer need to talk in terms of them.
2. The origins of sense-data
The idea that perceptual experience involves awareness of sense-data was a dominant
theme in discussions of perception and epistemology in the first half of this century.10
In contemporary discussion, by contrast, little attention is paid to the idea of sense-
data, or to the question to which they were supposed to provide an answer, ‘what are
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6the direct objects of perception?’.11 But it has not been sufficiently noted that a puzzle
emerged about sense-data that is closely parallel to the puzzle noted above about
qualia. In a paper published in 1936, called ‘Is there a problem about sense-data?’, G.A.
Paul remarked that
Some people have claimed that they are unable to find such an object [as a
sense-datum] and others have claimed that they do not understand how the
existence of such an object can be doubted.12
Sense-data were supposed to be the immediate objects of experience. So conceived,
our awareness of sense-data are among those facts about experience which are open
to philosophical reflection, rather than scientific theorising. One would expect, then,
that awareness of sense-data is something that can be gleaned from thinking about
‘what it is like’ to have an experience, in Nagel’s phrase. Since facts about what it is like
to have experience ought, on the face of it, be obvious to us, or obvious on reflection,
then the existence of sense-data ought to be obvious to us. If this is so, then how can
the situation described by Paul arise? How can it be that some philosophers deny that
they find sense-data in their experiences, and others claim that it is obvious—it cannot
be denied—that there are sense-data? This is the puzzle, parallel to our puzzle about
qualia, towards which Paul’s remark points.
To solve this puzzle, we need to know more about the role of the concept of
sense-data in the philosophy of the early 20th century. Many students of philosophy
first encounter the sense-datum theory of perception in the opening chapters of
Russell’s 1912 The Problems of Philosophy. Like much in Russell’s philosophy of this
period, the doctrines advanced in these chapters reflect strongly the influence of G.E.
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7Moore.13 And it was Moore who was the first to introduce the term ‘sense-data’ into
philosophy, in his 1910-11 lectures called Some Main Problems of Philosophy.14 But there is
a difference in the way that Moore thought of sense-data, and the way they have come
to be conceived in the later philosophical discussion. In contemporary discussions, the
sense-datum theory of perception is often put forward only to be refuted by the
manifest absurdity of its commitment to mysterious non-physical objects, the sense-
data of which we are supposedly aware.15 This commitment was influentially criticised
by J.L. Austin,16 and would be rejected by many naturalistic philosophers today on
broadly metaphysical grounds.
Now certainly, the idea of being aware of (and therefore causally affected by)
non-physical objects seems to be suggested by Russell’s account in the Problems. But in
his initial discussions, Moore did not introduce the term as having this meaning. In his
1910-11 lectures, Moore defines the term ‘sense-data’ by using an example of looking
at a white envelope. He then claims that what are seen are patches of colour and
shapes:
These things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually
see. And I propose to call these things, the colour and size and shape, sense-data,
things given or presented to the senses.17
Moore commented much later (1952) that he should have called the patch the sense-
datum, and not the properties of the patch—the colours are properties of the particular
patch. In another lecture in the 1910-11 series, Moore employs a similar strategy. In
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8asking us to look at a pencil, he says that what you ‘directly apprehend’ is ‘a patch of
brownish colour, bounded on two sides by fairly long parallel straight lines’. These
coloured patches are the sense-data you see.18
Moore distinguishes between the sense-datum, which is given to the mind, and
the sensation, which is the act or event of being aware of the datum. (This is what used
to be called an ‘act-object’ conception of experience.) Having made this distinction, we
can see that two possibilities emerge, within the terms of the definition put forward so
far. One is that sense-data are mind-independent objects presented in experience. The
other is that sense-data are not mind-independent objects. Are sense-data objects of
the first kind, or of the second? Moore’s answer to this question oscillates, throughout
all his discussions of perception. In his 1910-11 lectures, he denies that sense-data are
ordinary material objects, since while two people can see the same object, no two
people can sense the same sense-datum.19 This suggests an indirect realist account of
perception: sense-data, non-physical objects, are the immediate objects of experience in
virtue of which we are aware of physical objects. But, in a 1918-19 paper, ‘Some
judgements of perception’, we find him reverting to a direct realism (at least about the
objects of perception if not how they appear).
Perhaps because of this oscillation, Moore’s first attempts to define sense-data
did not meet with universal acceptance.20 So in a later paper, ‘A defence of common
sense’ (1925) he attempts to define them again in terms that should be so
uncontroversial that ‘there is no doubt at all that there are sense-data, in the sense in
which I am now using that term’.21 Again, his method is ostensive:
In order to point out to the reader what sort of things I mean by sense-data, I
need only ask him to look at his own right hand. If he does this he will be able
to pick out something ... with regard to which he will see that ... it is a natural
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9view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand,
but with that part of his surface which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a
little reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with
the part of the surface of  his hand in question. Things of the sort (in a certain
respect) of which this thing is, which he sees in looking at his hand, and with
regard to which he can understand how some philosophers should have
supposed it to be the part of the surface of his hand which he is seeing, while
others have supposed that it can’t be, are what I mean by ‘sense-data’.22
Moore adds that he meant to define the term in such a way that it should be an open
question whether or not the sense-datum is identical with part of the surface of his
hand. This attempt to clarify the position was famously criticised by O.K. Bouwsma on
the grounds that the procedure cannot identify sense-data in this neutral way unless
we already have Moore’s conception of what sense-data are.23 If we follow Moore’s
instructions and pick out the surface of our right hand, we will not be able to doubt
whether the thing we have picked out is the surface of our right hand unless we have
already picked it out as something which might not be the surface of our right hand:
that is, as a sense-datum. It is Moore’s conception of sense-data which is driving the
possibility of doubt, not vice versa.
However, Bowsma misses Moore’s point. What Moore is trying to do in this
passage, as the last quoted makes plain, is to  bring out the sense in which (almost) all
philosophers have agreed on something. They have disagreed about whether one sees
the surface of one’s hand:  some say that what is seen is the surface of one’s hand,
others deny that it is the surface of one’s hand. But what is the ‘it’ I am talking about
when I say that others ‘deny that it is the surface of one’s hand’? The ‘it’ is what Moore
means by sense-data: the object of experience, whatever it is. All one needs to do to
understand this definition of Moore’s is to understand how a philosopher might doubt
that what one sees when one seems to see the surface of one’s hand is indeed the
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surface of one’s hand. To do this is not to propose any particular philosophical theory
about the object: it is just to entertain the idea of an object of experience.
The matter becomes clearer when we consider H.H. Price’s views in Perception
(1932). Price, who had attended Moore’s lectures in Cambridge, introduces the notion
of sense-data in Moore’s way:
The term sense-datum is meant to be a neutral term ... The term is meant to
stand for something whose existence is indubitable (however fleeting)
something from which all theories of perception ought to start.24
To illustrate what kind of things these are whose existence is indubitable, Price
introduced the example of seeing a tomato:
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a
tomato I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether
there is a material thing there at all... One thing however I cannot doubt: that
there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from
a background of other colour-patches, naad having a certain visual depth, and
that this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness... that something
is red and round then and there I cannot doubt... that it now exists and that I am
conscious of it—by me at least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be
doubted... This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is
called being given, and that which is thus present is called a datum.25
Price  points out here that what can be doubted here is that it is a tomato I am seeing, or
that the thing is a material object. But what cannot be doubted is that there is
something red and round which I am seeing. Like Moore, then, Price introduces his
reader to the idea of sense-data as the entities, whatever they are, which are present to
consciousness in experience in this ‘peculiar and ultimate manner’.
Since J.L. Austin’s  criticism of the sense-datum theory in Sense and Sensibilia
(1962) it has become common to attribute the errors of the sense-datum theory to
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foundationalist, infallibilist epistemology: sense-datum theorists were trying to find the
certain basis of all knowledge.26 And the conclusion is drawn from this that once we
dispense with these epistemological requirements, the motivation to posit sense-data
evaporates. But, as M.G.F. Martin has made clear, the natural interpretation of the
passage from Price does not require attributing to him these epistemological
motives.27 Price’s point is essentially the same as Moore’s:  that perception presents us
with something, something is given to us—this something is the given. Price
distinguishes two methods by which we may distinguish different senses of the given,
the physiological and the immanent or phenomenological. The physiological enquiry
into perception delivers the given in a causal sense: the immediate causal precursors of
experience. The immanent method delivers the given in the phenomenological sense:
‘what is given to consciousness or presented to the mind’.
Price’s point, then, is that perceptual experience is relational: experience relates
us to something which is given to us.28 Among recent writers, Howard Robinson
endorses this view in what he calls his ‘Phenomenal Principle’: that when one has an
sensory experience as of something being F, there is something F which one is
experiencing.29 Now this principle may be controversial—and we shall find reasons for
doubting it—but it is not controversial because it entails a foundationalist infallibilist
epistemology, or an attempt to refute scepticism. And if we compare Robinson’s
Phenomenal Principle with Moore’s and Price’s remarks about sense-data, it is plain
that Robinson is essentially following through the same lines of thought as they
were.30 C.D Broad argued along the same lines that when we approach perception
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from what he calls the ‘purely phenomenological point of view’ perception is
‘ostensibly prehensive of the surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended’.31
Now Price thought it a ‘gross absurdity’ to suppose that the existence of sense-
data depend  on our awareness of them.32 But nonetheless, he could not
straightforwardly identify sense-data with material objects or their surfaces. The
reason comes from the essential consideration underlying the argument from illusion:
if my experience could be the same even if the material object of the experience did not
exist, then the  material object is not essential to the experience. But since it is
indubitable that experience is relational, that all experiences have objects, then the
objects of experience are not material objects. And since what is present to our minds
does not exist in our minds, then we are led to the conclusion that sense-data are non-
mental, non-physical objects. The argument involves many steps and many
assumptions, and it is not my aim to discuss it in detail here. The important point at
this stage is that the argument which leads sense-data theorists to the idea that sense-
data are non-physical objects is a further step, further to the introduction of the idea of
sense-data itself.
This brief survey has given us enough material to solve the puzzle in Paul’s
article. What Moore and Price think is obvious is that phenomenologically, perception
has a relational character: that experience involves being given something. To this
extent, they think that the existence of sense-data cannot be denied. But a more
demanding conception of sense-data arises from reflection on how to reconcile the
idea that experience is relational with the apparent possibility that a perceiver could be
in an indistinguishable mental state from a perception of a mind-independent object,
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and yet the mind-independent object not exist. If we allow this possibility, and we hold
that experience is relational, then it is a short step to admitting that what is given
cannot be a mind-independent object. Since the experience is qualitatively identical in
both cases, the conclusion is drawn that the object of the experience is the same in both
cases—assuming, of course, that the nature of the experience is supervenes on the
nature of its objects. And it is this conception of sense-data as objects which the
opponents of sense-data claim not to be able to find in experience.
In short, when Moore and Price say that the existence of sense-data cannot be
denied, what they mean is that it cannot be denied that experience is relational. But
when the critics of sense-data say they cannot find sense-data in experience, they are
questioning the existence of sense-data in the more demanding sense, the sense which
is generated by the conception of experience as relational plus the argument from
illusion. This, it seems to me, is the solution to the puzzle posed by G.A. Paul’s
remarks.33
In fact, it can be denied that experience is relational. This is, after all, what an
‘adverbial’ theory of perception says. An adverbialist holds the qualities sensed in
experience to be modifications of experience itself:  sensing a blue patch ought to be
understood as sensing bluely. This theory does deny what Moore and Price take to be
obvious. But it is not hard to understand how such a theory could have arisen out of a
resistance to sense-data in the demanding sense:  since it is absurd to suppose that
there are such strange objects outside the mind, the distinctions in experience which
these objects are supposed to mark must really be modifications of the experiences
themselves.34
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As we shall see, a similar distinction—between those who think that differences
between experiences are explained in terms of differences in their objects, and those
who think that some such differences are explained in terms of differences in
properties of the experiences—will be what provides the key to the puzzle about
qualia posed in section 1. This should not be surprising if I am right in my claim that
sense-data and qualia were introduced to play very similar roles. I shall attempt to
argue for this claim in the next section.
3. The origins of qualia
While sense-data are largely a British invention, it is American philosophy which can
lay claim to the invention of qualia. The first philosopher to use terms ‘quale’ and
‘qualia’ in something like its modern sense was C.S. Peirce. When Peirce wrote in 1866
that ‘there is a distinctive quale to every combination of sensation ... a peculiar quale to
every day and every week—a peculiar quale to my whole personal consciousness’, he
was talking about what experience is like, in a general sense, not restricted to the
qualia of experience in the sense in which it is normally meant today.35 William James
occasionally used the term specifically to discuss sensation, but as far as I can see the
term had no special technical significance in his philosophy or psychology.36 The term
is occasionally used by some of the so-called New Realists: for instance, we find R.B.
Perry talking of ‘sensory qualia which are localisable in the body’ but as with James the
term means little more than ‘sensation’.37
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It is fairly clear that the chief source of the technical use of the term ‘qualia’ is
C.I. Lewis’s discussion in Mind and the World Order (1929).38 The theme of this work is
to reconcile what Lewis saw to be correct in the idealism of those such as Royce, who
held that experience always involves interpretation or conceptualisation, and the
realism of his day, which held (along with Russell and Moore) that whatever the mind
grasps must be independent of the mind. The basis of Lewis’s reconciliation is a
distinction between two elements in our cognitive lives: the immediate data ‘which are
presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the
mind brings to those data.39 Lewis rejects the idealist critique that any experience is so
entirely conceptualised that there is no non-conceptualised core:
The distinction between this element of interpretation and the given is
emphasised by the fact that the latter is what remains unaltered, no matter what
our interests, no matter what we think or conceive. (p.52)
But the fact that there is this unaltered ‘given’ does not entail that we are able to
describe it, since ‘in describing it... we qualify it by bringing it under some category or
other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable
ways’ (p.52). So the given is in a sense ineffable:
The absolutely given is a specious present, fading into the past and growing into
the future with no genuine boundaries. The breaking of this up into the
presentation of things marks already the activity of an interested mind. (p.58)
Having made this claim, however, Lewis then goes on to say a little more about what
it is that is given:
                                                
38Mind and the World Order (London: Constable 1929). It is not difficult to see where Lewis
might have got the term from: his teachers at Harvard as an undergraduate were James and
Royce, and his postgraduate teacher in 1908-10 was Perry.
39Mind and the World Order p.38.
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In any presentation, this content is either a specific quale (such as the immediacy
of  redness or loudness) or something analyzable into a complex of such. The
presentation as an event is, of course, unique, but the qualia which make it up
are not. They are recognisable from one to another experience. (p.60)
Qualia, then, are properties of what is given. However, although they are universals,
since they can re-occur in distinct experiences (p.121), qualia should not be confused
with the objective properties of objects in the external world. The critical realists—R.W.
Sellars, C.A. Strong, together with C.D. Broad—are criticised for making this
confusion. Lewis’s reasons for distinguishing qualia from objective properties are that
objective properties are always more complex in nature than qualia, and their
existence extends beyond the specious present. The same objective property, for
instance blueness, can give rise to many different colour qualia in different situations
(p.121). It is the confusion between properties of objects and qualia that gives rise, in
Lewis’s view, to the absurdity of the idea of unsensed sensa—a problematic idea with
which those in the sense-data tradition struggled. Objective properties are what we
have knowledge of; we have no knowledge of qualia since ‘knowledge always
transcends the immediately given’ (p.132).
How then does Lewis allow himself to talk of the ‘immediacy of redness or
loudness’ as qualia?  His answer reveals a commitment to the possibility of inverted
qualia:
Qualia are subjective; they have no names in ordinary discourse but are
indicated by some circumlocution such as ‘looks like’... All that can be done to
designate a quale is, so to speak, to locate it in experience, that is, to designate
the conditions of its recurrence or other relations of it. Such location does not
touch the quale itself; if one such could be lifted out of the network of its
relations, in the total experience of the individual, and replaced by another, no
social interest or interest of action would be affected by such substitution.
(p.124)
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We can talk about qualia, then, by comparing them to properties in the world and by
locating them in terms of their relations to what brings them about. But our access to
qualia in this way will be inevitably indirect.
Qualia are properties, then; but what are they properties of? They cannot be
properties of material objects for the reason stated. Lewis’s answer is they are
properties of an event, the event which is the ‘presentation of the given’ (p.60). Qualia
are the ‘recognisable qualitative characters of the given’ (p.121). Lewis actually says
that ‘what is given may exist outside the mind—that question should not be
prejudiced’ (p.64). Initially, it is hard to square this thought with the idea that qualia are
‘subjective’ (p.124). However, Lewis’s remarks could be defended on the grounds that
exists outside the mind does not entail mind-independent. An object may be mind-
dependent even though it exists outside the mind: it may be an object of awareness,
distinct from the state of mind which is the awareness of it, which is brought into
existence by the state of awareness itself.
This recalls the conception of sense-data as the given: non-physical, non-mental
items which are present to the mind in experience. So what actually is the difference
between qualia and sense-data? As we have noticed, one difference is simply a
difference in metaphysical category: qualia are properties (so, universals) and sense-
data are particulars. But this need not be significant, since sense-data have properties
too, and qualia are the properties of a particular, the given. What exactly would be
wrong with an interpretation of qualia- and sense-datum theories which treats sense-
datum as the given, and qualia as the properties of the given?
Many of Lewis’s contemporaries and commentators saw the matter that way.
E.M. Adams explicitly identifies sense-data and qualia (though, as we have seen, this is
to confuse particulars and universals) and Lewis’s student Roderick Firth
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straightforwardly asserts that Lewis was a sense-datum theorist.40 This interpretation
is to true to the common meaning of ‘datum’ and ‘given’: after all, and Lewis clearly
would reject an adverbialist conception of experience. Both Lewis and the sense-data
theorists emphasise the given element in experience, and like Price, Lewis finds it to be
a plain fact about conscious experience that something is given in experience. As he
says, ‘no-one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in
consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter’ (p.53).41
However, the identification of qualia with the properties of sense-data would be
resisted by many contemporary philosophers who are happy to accept qualia (in their
sense) but will have nothing to do with sense-data, or even the given in any form.
Many of these philosophers would agree with the view Firth attributes to Lewis:
Lewis never makes the mistake that Thomas Reid so eloquently charged to
Descartes and the British Empiricists—the mistake of treating sense-experience
as the object of perception.42
The point attributed here to Reid became a common criticism of sense-data theories:
we do have sensations in perception, the objection runs, but that doesn’t mean we
perceive those sensations. Rather we perceive objects by having sensations—that is the
only role of sensation in perception. Now it is true that Lewis will not say that we
                                                
40E.M. Adams, ‘C.I. Lewis and the inconsistent triad of modern empiricism’ pp.377 and 384;
Roderick Firth, ‘Lewis on the given’ p.330, both in The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis ed. P.A.
Schillp (La Salle Illinois; Open Court 1968).
41Further reason for identifying qualia with the properties of sense-data can be derived by
looking at Goodman’s use of the concept of qualia in The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press 1951). For Goodman, qualia are the primitives of a
phenomenalist system of accounting for the whole of reality: they are the phenomenal
individuals out of which enduring public objects are constructed. To this extent, they resemble
the sense-data of Ayer, in The Central Questions of Philosophy (London: Weidenfeld 1973).
One thing that makes this discussion difficult to integrate with the contemporary issues about
qualia is that the distinction between the physicalistic and the phenomenalistic systems is
supposed to be a difference in ‘choice of language’ rather than in any matter of fact. On this
aspect of Ayer’s view, see Martin, ‘Austin: Sense and Sensibilia Revisited’.
42Firth, ‘Lewis on the given’ p.331.
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perceive experiences, since an experience is the state of being aware of the given. But
we are aware of the given: the given is not a sensation, but this is not a reason for
saying it is not a sense-datum. The criticism of sense-data theories just mentioned
misses the point, since as we saw with Moore and Price, sense-datum theories are
careful to distinguish the sense-datum from the ‘act’ of sensing it. They are not
committed to the view that we ‘see sensations’.
The heart of the matter, it seems to me, is this. Lewis’s qualia-theory and the
sense-datum theory resemble each other in their central claim: that in experience,
something is given. They differ in that Lewis thinks that the qualitative properties of
experience are in a sense ineffable, and can only be indirectly described; but in the
context of their common commitment to the given, this is a relatively unimportant
disagreement. As far as the core commitments of the two theories go, it would not
mislead to say that the given is a sense-datum, and qualia are its properties.
There is a radical difference in contemporary philosophers’ attitude to qualia
and their attitude to sense-data. Contemporary philosophers are fairly unanimous in
their rejection of sense-data. The idea that experience is not awareness of non-physical
objects is thought to be an out-dated product of a discredited epistemology and
philosophy of mind. But it is perhaps equally clear that there are as many
contemporary philosophers who accept the existence of qualia as there are those who
reject sense-data. Sense-data are the product of confusion; qualia, on the other hand,
are troublesome but undeniable features of our experience of which we have to give a
physicalist or naturalist account.
What has all this got to do with the mind-body problem? Lewis and Goodman
both had theories in which qualia play an important role; but they did not see this as
relevant to the question of the relationship between mind and body. We can trace the
explicit interest in the bearing of qualia on this relationship to Herbert Feigl’s 1958
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essay, The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’.43 Feigl accepts the ‘very persuasive arguments
[which] point simply to the existence ... of immediate experience, i.e. the raw feels or
hard data of the immediately given’.44  But he explicitly distinguishes his own form of
empiricism from C.I. Lewis’s epistemology, ‘according to which physical knowledge
concerns only the form or structure of events in the universe, whereas acquaintance
concerns the contents or qualia of existence’.45 The difference is that whereas Lewis
denied that qualia can be known at all, Feigl thought that they could be known by
acquaintance (for Lewis, acquaintance is not a form of knowledge). The given element
in immediate experience gives rise to the mind-body problem: for having allowed that
there can be knowledge of qualia, Feigl explicitly states what has now become known
as the ‘knowledge argument’ (though he does not, of course, draw the conclusion that
physicalism is false).
This gives us one link between Lewis’s conception of qualia and the current
‘problem of qualia’ for physicalism. But given the many ways that the term ‘qualia’ has
been used, do we have any firmer analytic reasons to suppose that the qualia which
pose the problem for physicalism are the qualia which are the properties of sense-data
or the given? I think there is, but teasing out the connection is a little complex: this is
the task of the next section.
4. The contemporary problem of qualia
When qualia are discussed in contemporary philosophy, how are they being
conceived? As might be expected, there is not one answer to this question, since in the
                                                
43The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’  first published in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1958). Reprinted with a postscript by the same publisher in 1967. Lawrence Nemirow makes the
explicit connection between his presentation of the problem and Feigl’s in his ‘Physicalism and
the cognitive role of acquaintance’ in W.G. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell
1987).
44‘The “mental” and the “physical”’ p.8. The expression ‘raw feel’ is from E.C. Tolman,
Purposive Behaviour in Man and Animals  (PLACE PUBLISHER 1932).
45‘The “mental” and the “physical”’  p.83.
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contemporary debate, the term ‘qualia’ is used in a number of different ways.  Dennett
says ‘qualia are supposed to be properties of a subject’s mental states that are 1.
ineffable; 2. intrinsic; 3. private; 4. directly or immediately apprehensible in
experience’46 Sydney Shoemaker describes the objection that functionalism cannot
account for qualia as substantially the same as the objection that functionalism ‘cannot
account for the “raw feel” component of mental states, or for their “internal” or
“phenomenological” character’.47  And Scott Sturgeon has said that qualia are just
those properties in virtue of which the experience has the conscious subjective
character it has.48 Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchell distinguish the use of the
word ‘qualia’ to denote non-physical properties of the mind (according to which the
existence of qualia is incompatible with physicalism) and the use of the word to denote
intrinsic non-functional properties (according to which the existence of qualia is
incompatible with functionalism).49 And M.G.F. Martin distinguishes (in the
contemporary debate) between qualia as conceived as properties of  experiences, and
qualia conceived as apparent properties of the objects of the experiences.50
What should we make of these very different uses of the term? The first thing
to notice is that the variety of uses provides us with a straightforward way of solving
the puzzle of section 1, in a parallel way to the solution provided with sense-data. As
with sense-data, there is a relatively innocuous sense of ‘qualia’ (roughly, Sturgeon’s)
where for a state to have qualia is just for it to be a conscious state. In this sense, Block
is right that the existence of qualia cannot be denied. But if qualia are the things
Dennett and Jackson/Braddon-Mitchell are talking about, qualia in the more
                                                
46 D. Dennett, ‘Quining qualia’ in W.G. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition p.523.
47S.Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and qualia’ in Identity, Cause and Mind  (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1980) p.185.
48‘The epistemic view of subjectivity’ Journal of Philosophy DATE VOLUME
49David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Oxford:
Blackwell 1996) pp.123-4.
50See M.G.F. Martin, ‘Setting things before the mind’ in Current Issues in the Philosophy of
Mind  ed. A. O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) pp.158-163.
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demanding sense, then it is not obvious that there are qualia. This predictable solution
to our puzzle parallels the solution for sense-data.
Solving this puzzle, however, does not resolve the substantial debate. For we
still need to know what qualia in the more demanding sense are, and whether there
are any such things. Here, since the mind-body problem is our concern, we should
follow the link I made above between Feigl and C.I. Lewis, and ask: which notion of
qualia is important for understanding their role in the mind-body problem? When
Frank Jackson said that he is a ‘qualia freak’, and went on to argue that the existence of
qualia presents a problem for physicalism, what did he mean by ‘qualia’? We can
address this question by asking what qualia would have to be for qualia-based
objections to physicalism to succeed.51 For the main role which qualia play in
contemporary debate is as the source of the central objection to physicalism: that
physicalism cannot account for qualia.
An argument against physicalism which simply appealed to the existence of
certain mental states (e.g. sensations) and then claimed that physicalism could not
‘account’ for these states is not an argument which should trouble physicalism. As
David Lewis has put it, in discussing the sensation of pain,
Pain is a feeling. To have pain and to feel pain are one and the same. For a state
to be pain and for it to feel painful are likewise one and the same. A theory of
what it is for a state to be pain is inescapably a theory of what it is like to be in
that state, of how that state feels, of the phenomenal character of that state...
Only if you believe on independent grounds that considerations of causal role
and physical realisation have no bearing on whether a state is pain should you
say that they have no bearing on how that state feels.52
                                                
51Frank Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal qualia’ Philosophical Quarterly 32 1982, pp.127-136.
52‘Mad pain and martian pain’ Philosophical Papers  volume I (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1983).
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The mere assertion that a physicalist cannot identify a supposed qualitative state with a
brain state is not an objection, but a straightforward denial of physicalism. To put the
point in this way is to beg the question.
Jackson’s well-known knowledge argument, however, does not beg the
question in this way against physicalism. The question it raises (as Lewis goes on to
note in a postscript to the paper just quoted) is Feigl’s  question: whether physicalism
can account for our knowledge of qualia, and the answer it gives is that physicalism
cannot do so, and that (surprisingly) there are therefore non-physical facts. The
argument starts with a thought-experiment involving a person, Mary, who is virtually
omniscient about colour and colour vision, who has lived all her life in a black-and-
white room, and has done all her learning there. When she leaves her room and sees
something red for the first time, she comes to know something new: what it is like to
see red. Let’s call this knowledge of the qualia of red. Jackson argues that if you cannot
know about qualia no matter what knowledge you have of the physical facts, then
knowledge of qualia cannot be the same as knowledge of anything physical. So if facts
are simply identified as the objects of knowledge, facts about qualia cannot be physical
facts.
I am not concerned here with whether the knowledge argument is successful,
or with the physicalist responses to the argument. I am only concerned here with what
has to be assumed about qualia if the argument is going to stand a chance of
succeeding. For this will tell us what qualia are, insofar as qualia are intended to
present a problem for physicalism. To begin with, we can ask what knowledge of
qualia is supposed to be being contrasted with. We are told that Mary knows all the
physical facts, so it might be thought that the contrast is between knowing everything
physical, and knowing something non-physical. Hence the relevance of the conclusion
to the truth of physicalism. But in fact, if the reasoning is sound, the conclusion is not
just that physicalism is false, but something stronger. For it is not directly relevant that
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the knowledge which one acquires about colours inside Jackson’s black-and-white
room is stated in the language of physics. Or even in the language of physics plus
physiology. What is relevant is that the knowledge can be stated at all: what one learns
in the black-and-white room is just knowledge which can be stated in some form or
another. As David Lewis says, ‘our intuitive starting point wasn’t  just that physics
lessons couldn’t help the inexperienced to know what it is like. It was that lessons
couldn’t help’.53
 This tells us something about what ‘physical facts’ are, for the purposes of the
knowledge argument: they are anything which could be learned in the black-and-
white room. So what about qualia? A first conjecture might be that qualia are those
properties knowledge of which requires experience of them. But this is not quite right:
redness maybe a property full knowledge of which requires experience; but one can
learn about redness in the black-and-white room (one can learn, for instance, that
tomatoes are red). What has one still to learn by experience? What is left out? The
answer is obvious, but in this context unhelpful: knowledge of what red is like. To say
that this is knowledge that can’t  be imparted through any lessons only tells us about
the knowledge, it doesn’t tell us about what the knowledge is knowledge of. What is it
knowledge of?
It is plain that the knowledge is knowledge of a property, since many people
can know what red is like. So using ‘qualia’ just to mean the properties which can only
be known by experiencing them, we can ask: what are qualia properties of? Many
philosophers assume that they are properties of experiences.54 But this does not follow
from the fact that knowledge of them requires experience. One could say that colours
are properties of public material objects, but they are properties which can only be
                                                
53See David Lewis, ‘What experience teaches’ in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p.281; see also D.H. Mellor, ‘Nothing like
experience’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92, 1992-3.
54See (e.g.) Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap’ Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983, 354-361.
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fully understood when experienced. If fully understanding something is understanding
all its properties, then understanding a property P is understanding P’s own
properties. So on this view, the qualia of red—i.e. what one has to experience in order
to fully understand red—are properties of properties. A red quale is a property of red.
The lesson of the knowledge argument on this view is that there are certain properties
of colours which can only be learned about through experience.
This is not the only possible view, of course.  I mention it here only to point out
that it does not follow that just because one needs experience to know X, that X is a
property of one’s mind. The fact is, as Martin has pointed out, that expressions like
‘how something looks to you’ hide an ambiguity. The ambiguity is between:
—how it is with you when you are looking at something
and
—how that something appears to be when you are looking at it.55
As Martin shows, when Dennett says that qualia are ‘how things seem to you’ and
then goes on to identify the reference of this phrase with properties of experiences
(only in order to deny the existence of such properties, of course) then he is taking the
phrase only in the first way. And when a representationalist like Lycan or Dretske
identify qualia with represented properties, they are using the phrase in the second
sense. In the first sense, qualia are properties of experiences; in the second sense, qualia
are properties of mind-independent properties. Dennett’s claim that qualia are  the
‘very properties the appreciation of which permits us to identify our conscious states’56
only serves to keep the distinction blurred.
But the qualia of the knowledge argument (call these properties ‘K-qualia’ for
convenience) cannot be straightforwardly identified with qualia in either of these
senses, to the exclusion of the other. All that K-qualia need to be is properties (of
                                                
55‘Setting things before the mind’ p.161.
56‘Quining qualia’ p.539 and 523
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properties) which can only be known by experience of those properties. ‘How red
looks’ or ‘what it is like to see red’ could pick out properties of redness, or properties
of the experience of seeing red. Whether or not the argument succeeds does not
depend on which of these understandings of ‘qualia’ we choose. It just affects the
conclusion we draw: we might say that, amazingly enough, there are properties of
some physical properties which are beyond the reach of objective science; or we might
say that, amazingly enough, there are properties of some mental properties which are
beyond the reach of objective science.
The term ‘quale’ is neutral, then, in the role it plays in the knowledge argument,
between being a property-of-a-mind-independent property, and property-of-a-
mental-property. It is also neutral, as should be obvious, between the question of
whether qualia are intentional or non-intentional. For suppose we assume
intentionalism: that all mental properties are intentional.57 This does not itself block
either the soundness or the validity of the knowledge argument: the conclusion is that
there are some intentional properties (representing redness by experiencing it) which
are inaccessible to objective science. An intentionalist could endorse this conclusion.
Assume the denial of intentionalism, and the argument’s  conclusion is equally
unaffected.
The generality of the knowledge argument’s conception of qualia might help
explain the pervasive appeal of the argument, and explain too why it is that the
argument seems so hard to refute. But just as most interpreters have taken the target
of the argument as physicalism narrowly conceived—i.e. all facts are physical or
physiological—so they have taken K-qualia in one particular way—as properties of
experience. In itself, there is nothing wrong with this: all I have said so far is that this
would have to be justified on grounds independent of the actual argument. This does
                                                
57For intentionalism, see Tim Crane, ‘Intentionality as the mark of the mental’ in O’Hear (ed.)
Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, and Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995).
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raise another question, though: what are these grounds? Why has it become so
standard to take qualia as properties of experiences? In the next section I shall attempt
to answer this question.
5. Qualia as properties of experience
It is not at all obvious that when we learn what it is like to taste retsina, we are learning
about a property of an experience. Isn’t it slightly more obvious, at least at first sight,
that we are learning something about retsina: viz., what it tastes like, or what it is like
to taste it? Yet many philosophers do take such knowledge to be obvious.58 This just
illustrates, once again, the puzzle with which we started: appealing to the obvious at
this stage makes progress impossible.
 So if we cannot appeal to what is obvious, how should we proceed? We want
to understand why contemporary philosophers take K-qualia to be properties of
experience. Many current diagnoses of this view, however, are as unsatisfactory as the
appeal to the obvious itself, in that they account for philosophers’ adoption of the view
in terms of pathological intellectual urges or simple errors. Dennett, for example, has
offered two such diagnoses of the urge to posit qualia as properties of experience. The
first is in terms of ‘the seductive step, on learning that public redness ... is a relational
property after all is to cling to [its] intrinsicality ... and move it into the subject’s head’.
The second diagnosis is an equally unthinking resistance to physicalism: ‘qualia seem
to many people to be the last ditch defense of the inwardness and elusiveness of our
minds, a bulwark against creeping mechanism ... otherwise their last bastion of
specialness will be stormed by science’.59 Neither of these diagnoses, it seems to me,
get to the heart of the matter. The first diagnosis has no explanation of why someone
                                                
58See, for example, the opening pages of Joseph Levine’s paper in T. Metzinger (ed.) Conscious
Experience (Paderborn: Schöningh-Verlag 1995).
59‘Quining qualia’ p.524. One of the weaknesses of Dennett’s discussions of this issue is his
failure to account for his disagreement with his opponents: Dennett gives us no account of why it
is that any reasonable person should think differently from him.
28
subject to this illusion should want to ‘cling to the intrinsicality of redness’. When
someone learns that weight is a relational property, there is no parallel urge to ‘cling to
its intrinsicality’, despite the fact that weight hardly seems relational. So what is so
special about redness? The diagnosis does not say. The second diagnosis, on the other
hand, leaves it utterly mysterious why physicalists should affirm the existence of
qualia, conceived of as properties of experience, regardless of whether they feel
troubled by them.60
So what is the reason to believe that qualia are properties of  experience? This is
where matters can be illuminated by returning to the origins of the idea of qualia. For
there is a parallel here with the discussions of C.I. Lewis and the sense-data theorists.
On Lewis’s  conception, qualia are a kind of K-qualia: they can only be known through
experience. As we saw above, Lewis’s qualia can be conceptualised, but this only gets
at their nature ‘indirectly’. So someone in the black-and-white room is someone who
cannot really understand which subjective qualia are being denoted by the term ‘red’.
(This is true for Feigl too, for obvious reasons: qualia or raw feels can only be known
through acquaintance.)
But Lewis denies that learning about K-qualia is learning about the higher-order
properties of objective properties (i.e. what they look like). As noted above, he denies
this partly because objective properties (e.g. the surface properties of objects in virtue
of which they are red) are more complex in nature than simple qualia, and partly
because the same objective property can give rise to distinct qualia (remember that he
endorsed the inverted spectrum possibility). So Lewis’s qualia are not properties of
public objects  or objective properties. But Lewis, like Price after him, does not thereby
infer that they are properties of states of mind. Rather, they are properties of an event,
the event which is the presentation of the given—a ‘phenomenal individual’. As I
                                                
60See, for example, David Lewis, ‘Should a materialist believe in qualia?’ in his Papers in
Metaphysics and Epistemology.
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noted at the end of section 3 above, it is would not be misleading to call this individual
a sense-datum.
These  reasons for denying that qualia are objective properties parallel (to a
certain extent) the reasons of those who are reluctant to identify colours in any
straightforward way with surface properties of objects. First, it is widely held that the
properties of objects which are responsible for colour experience (or K-qualia) do not
stand in any simple correlation with perceived colours. This does not stop us from
identifying colours with these properties in a more sophisticated way, but we have to
concede if we do this that either these properties will be lacking in the simplicity which
perceived ‘phenomenal’ colour has (perhaps they will be so-called ‘disjunctive
properties’61) or we will often be in error about the nature of the properties.62
Although some of the details differ, the reasoning here is parallel to Lewis’s reasoning
about why qualia are not properties of public, objective properties.
The second reason for refusing to identify qualia with properties of objects
derives from the inverted qualia thought-experiment.63 Some have argued that if it is
possible for a person A seeing  red to have an experience with the same K-qualitative
character as person B has when they see green, when both A and B are looking at
physically identical objects, then the difference in their experience cannot be a
difference in the objects. Therefore K-qualia, whatever they are, are not properties of
public objects, and nor are they properties of those properties. This parallels Lewis’s
acceptance of the inverted qualia hypothesis, and his view that locating a quale
relationally ‘does not touch the quale itself’.
But even if both these lines of argument are sound, they do not entail that K-
qualia are properties of experiences, without some further assumption.  The most they
                                                
61Or disjunctions of properties. This approach is taken by Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) chapter 4, ‘The primary quality view of colour’.
62See David Hilbert, Color and Color Perception (Stanford: CSLI 1987).
63See Shoemaker, ‘Qualities and qualia: what’s in the mind?’ in The First-Person Perspective
and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) pp. 108-113.
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establish is that K-qualia are not properties (first- or second-order properties) of public,
physical objects. For all that has been said, K-qualia could be properties of non-
physical, non-mental objects: sense-data, the given, on the Price/Lewis conception of
them.
However, few philosophers these days take the idea of such objects seriously.64
The naturalism which has dominated philosophy in the last forty or so years has
removed sense-data theories such as Price’s from the philosophical agenda: even
raising the question of commiting onself to these objects would be, in effect, to raise
the question of the adequacy of the methodology of current science. I am not
recommending bringing these theories back for serious consideration. I mention their
departure from the range of acceptable theories here just to fill the gap  in the
argument which leads to accepting K-qualia as features of experience. For
contemporary thinkers, to deny that qualia are properties of physical objects leaves
them with no alternative to thinking that K-qualia are properties of experience. No
matter how complex the physical properties which are causally responsible for colour
experience, the properties of the experience—phenomenal red—are perceptibly
simple. It turns out, then, that when one is aware of a red thing in experience, one is
also aware—in some sense—of a feature of one’s experience.
But merely to say this does not settle the question about the nature of this
feature. This brings us to the next distinction in the use of the term ‘qualia’ mentioned
in section 4 above: qualia conceived either as intentional or as non-intentional
properties of experience. The view of qualia as intentional properties of experience is
well-expressed by Lycan. Lycan begins by explaining that he has C.I. Lewis’s
conception of qualia in mind: ‘a quale is the introspectible monadic qualitative property
of what seems to be a phenomenal individual, such as the colour of what Russell called
a visual sense datum’. But his theory of qualia is that ‘a quale is a represented property,
                                                
64A striking exception is Robinson, Perception.
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an intentional object; S’s visual sensation represents the tomato as having the colour
red’.65 Qualia, on this intentionalist’s view, are the represented properties, the
properties which experience represents the world as having; they are ‘properties of
experience’ in the sense that the content of a belief is a property of it. The belief that it’s
raining has the property of representing the world as being such that it’s raining. Perhaps
this is a relational property—perhaps it is a monadic property identified in terms of a
relation to an abstract object. It doesn’t matter for present purposes. Obviously,
intentionalists have their work cut out in accounting for the inverted spectrum
possibility—and usual approaches may deny that the relevant kind of inversion is a
possibility, or they hold that that one of the ‘inverts’ is in error about the real colour of
things, or they adopt an error theory of colour altogether.66
Opposed to the intentionalist view is the view that treats qualia as intrinsic, non-
intentional properties of experiences, the view defended forcefully by Block.
Phenomenal red, the other colours, all the conscious properties of experience which
make it have the phenomenal character it has—these are all intrinsic properties of
experiences, with no intentional content themselves.67 Block takes this as apparent
from reflection on experience, or from reflection on certain thought-experiments,
notably the ‘inverted earth’ thought-experiment. But insofar as what makes us talk in
terms of qualia at all is the considerations which give rise to the knowledge
argument—subjective experience—we have no reason to prefer non-intentionalism to
intentionalism. Block is wrong therefore when he accuses the intentionalist of a fallacy:
the fallacy of intentionalising qualia.68 Even if it is a mistake, not all mistakes are
fallacies.
                                                
65W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience  p.99 (MIT Press 1996).
66For further discussion, see chapter 4 of Lycan, Consciousness and Experience.
67Though they may be properties of states which have intentional content—e.g. perceptual
states.
68Ned Block, ‘Inverted earth’ in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of
Consciousness (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press 1997).
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But is it a mistake to intentionalise qualia? This is a question I cannot address in
detail here.69 However, I do think that if we are to learn anything at all from the
discussion of these matters earlier in the century, a negative answer is strongly
suggested. Recall the lesson of our investigation into sense-data: what was supposed to
be obvious in the sense-datum theory was the idea that in experience, something is
given to the experiencer. Or, in other words, experience has an apparently relational
structure. Sense-data are, in Price’s phrase, what is ‘immediately given to
consciousness or present to the mind’. It is a further step, derived from the arguments
from illusion and hallucination, to say that what is given is a mind-dependent object.
So to reject such objects is not to reject the very idea of the given.
As I said in section 3 above, there were philosophers—the adverbialists—who
rejected the idea that something is given in experience, that experience has a relational
character. For an adverbialist, to experience an F is to experience F-ly; that is, to have
one’s experience modified in a certain way. Contemporary non-intentionalists like
Block do not accept the adverbialists’ way of speaking, but the essence of their view is
the same, when it concerns the qualitative or conscious character of an experience: this
character derives from intrinsic non-intentional properties of the experience, rather
than from what is given in experience.
The natural suggestion, to complete the picture, is that the contemporary
counterpart for the idea of the given is the idea of intentionality. For an intentional state
is one in which the mind is directed on an object, one which presents an object, or one
which has a content or a subject-matter. As these phrases suggest, intentional states
seem to be relational. Of course, many theories of intentionality end up denying that
intentional states are genuine relations—some call them ‘quasi-relational’—but the
point is rather that these states give the appearance of presenting something, even if
                                                
69I do try and address it in ‘Intentionality as the mark of the mental’  and in ‘The intentional
structure of consciousness’, forthcoming in A.Jokic and Q.Smith (eds.) Aspects of Consciousness
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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(as in the case of hallucination) there is nothing there to be presented. So a theory
which treats perceptual experiences as intentional states understands the given in a
particular way: what is given is an intentional object. This is why Lycan can claim to be
following C.I. Lewis in defending qualia as the properties of the given, translating
them into modern intentionalist terms.
The dispute between intentionalists like Tye and Lycan, on the one hand, and
non-intentionalists like Block on the other, resembles in an important respect the
dispute between sense-data theorists and adverbialists. What they are debating is
whether the consciousness involved in experience is exhausted by its relational or
quasi-relational intentional structure; that is, by what is given to the mind and the way
it is given. Both can agree that in some sense qualia are properties of experiences; to
say that they are intentional properties is partly to say that the idea of the given is the
central idea in understanding perceptual consciousness; to say that they are non-
intentional intrinsic properties is to say that perceptual consciousness cannot be
understood in terms of what is given to the mind.
Nothing I have said in this section should be regarded as an argument against
the non-intentionalist conception of qualia. What I have tried to do is to disagnose why
qualia are treated as properties of experiences, and to show that even once this has
been accepted, there are still two remaining conceptions of qualia: the intentionalist
and the non-intentionalist. That is, accepting that qualia are properties of experience
does not yet get you to Block’s conclusion. Nonetheless, I believe that if we want to
recover the truth in the sense-datum theorist’s claim that experience presents itself as
relational, then we should favour an intentionalist conception of qualia. But to defend
this claim in detail would need further work.
6. Conclusion
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One main debate in contemporary theories of consciousness and qualia is
between intentionalists like Tye, Dretske and Lycan, and non-intentionalists like
Block. I draw two lessons for this debate from this investigation into the origins
of qualia. First,  insofar as what makes us talk in terms of qualia at all is the
considerations which give rise to the knowledge argument—subjective
experience—we have no reason to prefer non-intentionalism to intentionalism.
Second, the very considerations which originally drove philosophers to
qualia—the relational conception of experience, the idea of the given—now tend
to favour an intentional conception of the qualia of perceptual experience rather
than an intrinsic conception. However, given the many, varied and conflicting
uses to which the term ‘qualia’ has been put, and given the dominant association
of the idea of qualia with non-intentionalist views, it may be less misleading to
express this conclusion by saying that the reflections on the nature of the given
should lead us to reject qualia. In this sense, appreciation of the origins of qualia
should discourage us from talking about qualia in experience at all.
